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ABSTRACT 
Dwight Goodwin, M.A. 
Department of International Studies, December 2007 
University of Kansas 
 
Following 9/11, the United States asserted that terrorism and technology presented an 
immediate and present danger to national security.  The Bush Administration responded 
to this threat by making development a core foreign policy priority.  A central goal of this 
revised strategy was to create economic growth and opportunity in fragile states, thereby 
limiting the space where extremists and terrorists could operate.  This thesis will 
incorporate two histories: the academic debate surrounding Lipset’s “economic growth 
thesis” and the foreign assistance role of the United States Agency for International 
Development.  The primary research question will consider whether evidence exists that 
the economic growth thesis has informed foreign aid practices, and if so, to what extent.  
The secondary research aim will be to assess the newly revised bilateral foreign aid 
policy in terms of the economic development components it possesses and its potential to 
achieve the objectives prescribed by the Bush Administration. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Elevation of Foreign Aid in US Foreign Policy 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
“Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and build a durable peace is to 
support the advance of democracy everywhere.”1 ---William Jefferson Clinton 
 
Americans “know, by history and by logic, that promoting democracy is the surest 
way to build security. Democracies don't attack each other or threaten the peace.”2 --
-George W. Bush 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
I. The puzzle: Democratization, Foreign Aid and the USAID 
In recent years the motivation for democratization has shifted from the calculated 
deterrence policy of the Cold War to a strategy emphasizing free market access and 
the long-term stability of the international system.  In addition, the general embracing 
of the democratic peace thesis, which posits that democratic nations do not go to war 
with each other, has provided additional incentives for democratic governments to 
pursue democratization as a foreign policy goal.  This faith in the ability of 
democratic societies to create stability in the international system has been a 
conviction of every US president since the Reagan administration, strengthening 
considerably since the terrorist attacks of 2001.  In fact, according to the 2002 version 
of “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (NSS), the US 
government now considers foreign aid a priority on par with the other long-standing 
pillars of defense and diplomacy for the first time in US history.3  The rationale 
                                                 
1  Bill Clinton, "State of the Union Address," in Washingtonpost.com, ed. White House 
(Washington, D.C.: Washington Post, 1995), 20. 
2  George W. Bush, "Bush on Freedom Agenda," in VOA.com (2006). 
3   "Foreign Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security, and Opportunity," ed. United 
States Agency for International Development (GPO, 2002), iv. 
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behind this major policy shift centers on the idea that weak governance and 
underdevelopment in failed and fragile states create space for radical ideologies to 
foment and for terrorists to operate, posing a direct national security threat to the 
United States.  This major upgrade of development as a top priority has led to the 
introduction of a new US bilateral foreign aid policy emphasizing the need to 
stabilize fragile states, to reward good governance, to promote sustainable 
development, and to establish effective graduation criteria so recipient states can 
avoid developing long-term dependencies on aid resources. 
This thesis brings together two histories to consider the political context for 
foreign assistance in the post-9/11 environment.  The first history to consider is the 
evolution of Lipset’s 1959 groundbreaking work, “Some Social Requisites for 
Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy.”  A review of this 
body of literature on the economic growth thesis4 will be foundational in 
demonstrating the current conventional wisdom that economic growth accelerates 
democratic consolidation.  In turn, this debate will inform a second stream of inquiry, 
the past and present roles of the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) in disseminating foreign aid around the globe.  Ultimately, the goals for 
bringing these two histories together are threefold: first, to assess to what extent the 
academic debate has informed USAID policy in the past; second, to determine the 
current relationship between “economic threshold” theory and the foreign aid policies 
of USAID; finally, to ascertain whether organizational and policy shifts within 
                                                 
4   Lipset’s thesis suggested a linear relationship between economic growth and democratization. 
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USAID since 9/11 are likely to support the administration’s overall foreign policy 
objectives. 
Although the connection between economic threshold theory and USAID foreign 
aid directives may not be immediately obvious to the reader, there are two important 
reasons why this relationship requires investigation.  First, as noted above, 
developmental assistance has been elevated to a core priority for the first time in US 
history.  This is because fragile states “are now recognized as a source of our nation’s 
most pressing security threats,”5 meaning the United States has a vested interest in 
maximizing its foreign aid dollar and achieving optimal, rather than ordinary results.  
Second, since the core component of the new bilateral aid policy is transformational 
development, which dictates not only fundamental changes in institutions and 
governance, but also the creation of sustainable economic development, relevant 
studies within the social sciences should be considered for potential application to 
official aid policy.  For these reasons, this thesis will explore how these two histories 
interact and how economic growth strategies can inform USAID aid practitioners in 
the post-9/11 international system. 
                                                 
5   "Fragile States Strategy," ed. United States Agency for International Development (GPO, 2005), 
1. 
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_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
“Certain levels of ‘basic’ socio-economic development appear to be necessary to 
elevate countries to a level at which they can begin to support complex, nation-
wide patterns of political interaction, one of which may be democracy.”6 ---
Deane Neubauer 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
   
II. Economic Thresholds 
 
Among the many democratization theories is the idea that certain economic 
thresholds exist, beyond which the potential for democratic success improves 
significantly or can be virtually guaranteed.  For example, because no democratizing 
country has ever reverted to an authoritarian-style government once it has attained a 
per capita income level of $6000,7 this threshold is considered the benchmark for 
which all lower-income democracies should strive.  When coupled with other 
measurements, thresholds potentially reveal a developmental road map for lower 
income political systems.  The implications are even stronger when nascent 
democracies – which are generally poor and unstable – are considered.   
This notion of economic thresholds, first proposed by Deane Neubauer, suggests a 
variety of implications for political democracy.  In addition to the fail-safe $6000 
benchmark, Adam Przeworski also notes that there is strong statistical evidence that 
economic development will increase the prospects of democratic stability within a 
given country.  For instance, at the lowest levels of development, democracies are not 
as stable as autocracies, but once per capita income exceeds $750, democracies 
                                                 
6   Deane Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy," The American Political Science Review 61, 
no. 4 (1967): 1007. 
7   Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," World Politics 
49, no. 2 (1997): 7. 
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gradually become more stable than autocracies.8  Huntington implies this when he 
suggests there is a “coup-success ceiling” that ends at an approximate per capita 
income of $1,000 and “coup-attempt ceiling” ending at approximately $3,000.9  In 
addition, Przeworski points out the fact that poor democracies – defined as those 
under $1,000 of per capita income – are extremely fragile,10 possessing a life 
expectancy of only eight years.11  As per capita wealth increases, these numbers 
increase significantly.  For example, when per capita income reaches $1,000-$2,000, 
democratic survival is projected to last sixteen years, thirty-three years in the $2,000-
$4,000 range, and one hundred years in the $4,000-$6,000 range.12 This upward 
stabilization trend continues until per capita income exceeds $6,055,13 at which point 
democracies are seen to be permanent.14 
While the above thresholds are promising to democracy strategists, the empirical 
results also reveal strong counter-arguments to help moderate premature enthusiasm.  
For while it appears that once established in a developed country, democracy endures 
regardless of economic performance,15 this is not the case among the world’s poorest 
                                                 
8  Paul Collier, V. L. Elliot, Havard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol and Nicholas 
Sambanis, "Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy,"  (World Bank and 
Oxford University Press, 2003), 64-65. 
9  Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy for the Long Haul," in Consolidating the Third Wave 
Democracies, ed. Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu and Hung-mao Tien, A Journal 
of Democracy (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1997), 7. 
10  Adam Przeworski et al., "What Makes Democracies Endure?," Journal of Democracy 7, no. 1 
(1996): 40. 
11  Przeworski and Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," 165. 
12  Przeworski et al., "What Makes Democracies Endure?," 41. 
13  This dollar amount was the per capita income level of Argentina when democracy failed in 1975.  
Of the nine incidences of democratic failure beyond a per capita income of $3,000, Argentina has 
experienced four of those failures.  See Przeworski and Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and 
Facts," 165, 70-71. 
14  Ibid.: 165. 
15  Przeworski et al., "What Makes Democracies Endure?," 41. 
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countries.  In fact, Handelman indicates that although poor countries may be as likely 
to attempt a change to democracy as rich countries, they are much less likely to 
succeed.16  Indeed, Przeworski’s own conclusions highlight this unfortunate trend as 
well; few countries with per capita income under $1,000 develop economically under 
any kind of government, and when democracies do try to spring up in these countries, 
the likelihood they will die quickly is high.17  Thus, while there is reason to hope that 
democratic stability can be achieved incrementally through steady economic growth 
in all low to middle-income countries, the reality is the odds are heavily against the 
poorest of them.  This begs the question: are U.S. democratization programs 
adequately accounting for the effects of economic growth on nascent democracies?  If 
so, how is economic development used to promote democratization; if not, what 
alternative democratization programs are being pursued and why do they have 
priority over economic development strategies? 
                                                 
16  Howard Handelman, The Challenge of Third World Development, 4th ed. (Upper Saddle River: 
New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2006), 32. 
17  Przeworski et al., "What Makes Democracies Endure?," 49. 
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III. Rationale and Methodology 
 
Bridging the gap between threshold theory and foreign policy practice requires 
investigation of the academic debate and the historical role of foreign aid.  The first 
step in this process is to explore the history of ideas associated with the economic 
growth thesis and economic threshold theory.  Testing the economic threshold 
hypothesis can be challenging because it is easily entangled with a “chicken versus 
egg” controversy, i.e. does economic growth cause democratization or does 
democratization enable economic growth?  Additionally, theories abound regarding 
what conditions need to be present in order for economic growth to bring about 
democratization.  Certainly, the influx of financial aid into developing countries has 
not always resulted in economic growth; on the contrary, it has often resulted in 
further corruption, poorer conditions, and sustained economic stagnation.  Yet enough 
data exists to suggest that economic aid properly administered has the potential to 
create economic growth.  While few researchers have even hinted at an exclusive 
unidirectional linear relationship between economic growth and democratization, 
almost all agree that a correlation exists between economic development and 
increased democratization within nascent democracies, making this analysis of 
threshold theory and USAID policy a timely response to the US government’s recent 
emphasis on development as a core priority.  
With this background in mind, Chapter Two will review the literature associated 
with the economic growth thesis proposed in the 1959 work of Martin Seymour 
Lipset.  This assessment of the literature will be presented in chronological order, 
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allowing the contributions and critique of each author to build on previous efforts.  It 
is important to note that authors were selected for this review based not only on their 
contributions to the economic growth debate, but also for their direct interaction with 
and critique of Lipset’s original thesis.  Although this focus on researchers involved 
in the evolution of Lipset’s thesis is necessary to ensure manageable objectives for 
the review, it does regretfully limit the presentation of other possible explanations for 
political development, such as the social class theories of Evelyne Huber, Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer, and John Stephens, and the authoritarian/modernization account of 
Guillermo O’Donnell.18  However, despite the need to focus this review on authors in 
the Lipset tradition, a variety of divergent views will emerge regarding what 
conditions and variables are essential to the democratization process.  
Second, given the elevated priority of development in the national security 
agenda, it is important to evaluate the effectiveness of aid strategies employed by the 
United States, specifically the policies of USAID, the agency charged with 
administering foreign aid programs worldwide.  Any assessment of USAID must not 
only consider the directives of the emerging policy, but also the historical role of 
USAID as the primary democracy promotion arm of the US government.  Since its 
founding by President Kennedy in 1961, USAID has been authorized to develop and 
administer foreign aid programs and to disseminate official US government aid to 
support that agenda.  However, since the 1990s that mandate has been primarily a 
                                                 
18  See Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist 
Development and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).  Guillermo A. 
O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism : Studies in South American 
Politics, Text ed., Politics of Modernization Series ; No. 9 (Berkeley: Institute of International 
Studies, University of California, 1979). 
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mission of promoting democratic movements and governments via various 
democracy and governance (DG) initiatives,19 with only occasional forays into the 
realm of economic policy.  With the recent reorganization of USAID to include 
creating and administering sustainable economic programs under the new rules set 
forth in the “Policy Framework for Bilateral Foreign Aid,” it is important to 
investigate whether the agency is ready to respond accordingly.   
Chapter Three will therefore consider the historical role of USAID’s 
democratization programs.  This brief review will explore two facets of USAID 
history: the government’s focus on institution building as the centerpiece of 
democratization efforts prior to 9/11 and the relationship between economic growth 
strategies and foreign aid policies of the past.  Following this brief history, focus will 
shift to the systemic changes in international politics that compelled the United States 
to change its approach to foreign aid and how those changes have influenced USAID 
policy since 9/11.  This will include many of the Bush administration’s chief 
proposals, including the “New Compact for Development,” the Millennium Challenge 
Account, and “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” as 
well as the ideological origins of the Bush Doctrine and the president’s Freedom 
Agenda.  These presidential initiatives, in turn, provide the context for evaluating key 
USAID foreign policy strategies implemented following the establishment of the new 
national security strategy.  This review of primary documents will not only chronicle 
                                                 
19   USAID defines Democracy and Governance as “technical assistance and other support to 
strengthen capacity of reform-minded governments, nongovernmental actors, and/or citizens in 
order to develop and support democratic states and institutions that are responsive and accountable 
to citizens.”  See "At Freedom's Frontiers: A Democracy and Governance Strategic Framework," 
ed. United States Agency for International Development (2005), 4. 
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the evolution of US foreign policy since 9/11, it will also clarify why such a dramatic 
shift in official US policy occurred in the first place.  The concluding section of this 
chapter will then consider the “Policy Framework for Bilateral Aid,” the apparent 
culmination of USAID efforts to develop a comprehensive strategy built on the 
precepts of the “National Security Strategy,” in order to ascertain whether the 
policy’s directives will support its stated objectives. 
While the middle chapters (CH 2-3) explore the histories of Lipset’s theory and 
USAID practice separately, Chapter Four will investigate the links between them.  
Again, the focal point of investigation will be USAID primary documents – this time 
to look for evidence that aid policy has been informed by the academic debate.  Once 
the extent of this relationship is established, focus will shift towards evaluating 
USAID’s suitability to fulfill the mandate of the NSS.  One goal of this exercise will 
be to compare the practice of foreign aid with official discourse to ascertain whether 
substantive change has occurred, or if bureaucratic priorities have remained largely 
unaltered.  A second objective will be to consider some of the challenges to USAID 
effectiveness, including such topics as its past role in democracy promotion and its 
designation as a sub-cabinet level agency.  Finally, the chapter will reconsider the 
central concern of this paper, whether or not economic growth is adequately 
employed in US democratization strategies.  Given the elevation of development as a 
core priority, it is hoped this discussion will spawn a further look at US aid strategies.   
 11
CHAPTER TWO 
The Economic Growth Thesis 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
“The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain 
democracy”20   ---Martin Seymour Lipset 
 
“The prima facie evidence in support of this hypothesis is overwhelming: all 
developed countries in the world constitute stable democracies while stable 
democracies in the less developed countries remain exceptional.”21 ---Adam 
Przeworski, Fernando Limongi 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
I. The Development of Lipset’s Thesis 
 
This chapter will consider the economic growth thesis proposed in the 1959 work 
of Martin Seymour Lipset, giving special attention to Deane Neubauer’s economic 
threshold theory and Adam Przeworski’s work on the correlation between per capita 
income and democratic stability.  Since Lipset’s thesis has been the center of 
numerous well-designed studies, the focus of this review will be to consider 
Neubauer’s notion of economic thresholds in light of Przeworksi’s claims that 
democratization becomes more likely as per capita income increases, with the end 
goal of assessing whether U.S. democratization programs adequately employ 
economic growth strategies when engaging nascent democracies.  Much of the early 
literature associated with the question of economic development and democratization 
is focused on the transition from authoritarianism (dictatorships) to democracy.  One 
of the driving questions the pioneers in the field were addressing was whether 
                                                 
20   Martin Seymour Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and 
Political Legitimacy," The American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (1959): 75. 
21   Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Political Regimes and Economic Growth," The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 7, no. 3 (1993): 62. 
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increased wealth would cause regime change in an authoritarian state and create the 
conditions necessary for the implementation of democracy.  Later, as social scientists 
began to propose theories and conduct empirical studies, investigation began to center 
around such topics as causation, socio-economic thresholds, income inequality and 
sequencing. 
Any discussion of the impact of economic development on democratization 
necessarily begins with Martin Seymour Lipset.  His thesis claiming that “the more 
well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy”22 spawned 
what one author declared was the largest body of literature on any subject in 
comparative politics.23  Lipset’s seminal work explored the effects of certain indices 
of wealth, which included per capita income, number of citizens per doctor and per 
motor vehicle, plus the number of telephones, radios and newspapers per 1,000 
people.   From this study, he posits that there are some requisites to democratization, 
of which he includes education, wealth, political legitimacy and effectiveness. He 
concludes that economic development, which incorporates industrialization, 
urbanization, a high degree of education and the steady increase of societal wealth, 
“is a basic condition sustaining democracy.”24  He partially explains this theory by 
suggesting that increased wealth changes the stratification of society “from an 
elongated pyramid, with a large lower-class base, to a diamond with a growing 
                                                 
22  Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," 75. 
23  Przeworski and Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," 156. 
24  Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," 86. 
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middle class.”25  The creation of a larger middle class in turn creates an environment 
more conducive to long-term democratization.   
Although Lipset’s thesis starts by speaking of correlation, many critics believe he 
slips too easily into the language of causation.  As a result, there are two possible 
interpretations of Lipset’s views.  On one hand, it is possible to infer from his 
discussion that social conditions and/or economic factors may not necessarily cause 
democracy, but that these factors are typically more conducive to democratic 
development.  However, the more traditional (and likely) understanding of Lipset’s 
thesis holds that by asserting economic development – consisting of the closely 
related factors of industrialization, urbanization, wealth and education – “carr[ies] 
with it the political correlate of development,”26 Lipset was staking his claim that 
economic development causes democratization.  Either way, the idea that social and 
economic conditions could affect the democratic path of countries spawned enormous 
investigation into the relationship of social and economic conditions to the growth of 
democracy in developing countries. 
The early critics of this “economic growth thesis” embraced Lipset’s general 
claim that economic growth advanced the chances that any given nation would 
democratize.  At the same time, the simplicity of his methodology was frequently 
criticized.  The earliest response to Lipset was by Phillips Cutright, who faulted 
Lipset for privileging advanced democracies in his effort to demonstrate the effect 
that economic development has on national political systems.  He illustrated this point 
                                                 
25  Ibid.: 83. 
26  Ibid.: 80. 
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by showing that the range of scores between Lipset’s two groupings, essentially 
highly developed European democracies versus all other forms of government, is so 
extreme that it is nearly impossible to place a country in either grouping based on any 
of the indicators Lipset tested.27  Cutright posited two reasons why Lipset’s model 
failed to produce the proof of a relationship between economic growth and political 
development: first, that Lipset did not develop an index or scale for democracy on 
which to locate the dependent economic variables, and second, that his concept did 
not account for variations within national political systems.28 
To counteract the inherent weaknesses in Lipset’s methodology, Cutright sought 
to test the hypothesis that political institutions are interdependent with education, 
economic development, urbanization and labor force distribution by developing an 
index of political development.  Although his definition of political development was 
almost as favorable to democracies as was Lipset’s preference for European 
democracies, his method did produce some additional benefits over Lipset’s model.  
First, it totals each country’s annual scores for a period of two decades rather than 
providing a limited snapshot view of those countries during a narrow time frame.  
This cumulative effect allows a truer picture of political development to emerge and 
for the effect of communication improvements to be gauged.  Secondly, Cutright’s 
methodology produced a prediction equation, enabling social scientists the 
                                                 
27  Cutright gives the example of Latin American democracies having an average of 25 telephones per 
1000 people, while European dictatorships had up to 196 per 1000.  See Phillips Cutright, 
"National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis," American Sociological Review 28, 
no. 2 (1963): 254. 
28  Ibid.: 253-55. 
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opportunity to test theories of change against what actually occurs and to modify 
those theories for further testing. 
Cutright’s study found a high degree of association between all the predicting 
variables he analyzed (communication, urbanization, education, and agriculture), but 
noted that the variable that seems to be most predictive for political development is 
communication.29  However, he was also quick to point out that communication is 
highly correlated with the education index, which has a .95 correlation with economic 
development.30  Thus, while generally contributing to the notion that economic 
development, along with all of its correlates, has a hand in bringing about political 
development, Cutright ultimately is unable to do more than advance the general 
proposition that all aspects of national development tend to bring about further 
political development. 
Deane Neubauer rejected the linear approach of Lipset and Cutright altogether.  
Rather than attempting to explain the social conditions necessary to democracy31 by 
comparing the relative success of “developed” Europe against the predominantly non-
democratic “underdeveloped” countries of Latin America as Lipset had, he developed 
a more complex empirical test utilizing an index of democratic development capable 
of measuring variations within the grouping as well as similarities.32  Whereas 
Lipset’s model focused on four economic factors influencing political development, 
Neubauer attempted to measure electoral equality and competition within a given 
                                                 
29  Ibid.: 257, 60. 
30  Ibid.: 260. 
31  Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," 72. 
32  Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy," 1004. 
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political system.33  The results of this study led him to suggest a curvi-linear 
approach, in which “basic” socio-economic development is a necessary requisite for 
higher-function political development (including democracy); however, once a 
country rises above this unspecified socio-economic “threshold,” democratic practice 
is no longer influenced by economic development.34  This theory had two major 
implications for future studies: first, it induced investigation into the concept that 
certain economic thresholds might have implications towards sustainable democracy, 
and second, that democratic development might be susceptible to the law of 
diminishing returns in regards to the future impact of economic growth. 
The early empirical works of Lipset, Cutright and Neubauer were instrumental to 
the introduction of new theories to explain the relationship between development and 
democratization.  While their conclusions were generally accepted early in the debate, 
soon scholars began to question whether the definitions they used and the 
methodologies they employed were lacking in nuance.  One of those critics, 
Dankwart Rustow, was concerned that democratic theorists of his day were mostly 
focused on the functional aspects of democracy.  What distinguishes Rustow’s work 
from these theorists is his effort to investigate the genetic question and his emphasis 
on proper sequencing (instead of adhering to a set of preconditions that must be in 
place prior to democratization).  Regarding the former, Rustow lays out several 
essentials for genetic inquiry: it is essential to distinguish correlate from cause, it 
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should assume a form of circular interaction or two-way causality, and it should 
include diachronic data, preferably including periods just before and just after the 
advent of democracy.35  Concerning the latter, Rustow’s model rejects preconditions 
to democracy, focusing instead on the proper sequencing of the necessary ingredients, 
of which national unity, struggle, democratic rules and an electorate committed to 
those rules, are included.36 
Given his interest in understanding the genesis of democracy, it is unsurprising 
that Rustow found the efforts of Lipset and Cutright to be insufficient.  In addition to 
highlighting the functional nature of Lipset’s study, Rustow also notes that Lipset 
often slips from the language of correlation to the language of causality, even though 
Lipset initially is careful to make the distinction between “requisite” and 
“prerequisite.”37  In Rustow’s view, this confusion between the functional and genetic 
is particularly problematic among Lipset’s readers who may interpret “requisites” to 
mean “preconditions.”  Another criticism Rustow levels is that Lipset’s statistical 
findings reveal only correlations at a given point in time.  Even though correlation 
can offer a clue as to causality, it does not indicate the directional flow, which makes 
a diachronic study more valuable to genetic investigation than the snapshot view 
provided in Lipset’s study. 
Another early critic who attempted to analyze the methodologies of early 
supporters of the economic growth thesis was Robert Jackman, who sought to 
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highlight the differences between the linear thesis of Lipset and Cutright versus the 
“threshold hypothesis” of Neubauer.  Though Jackman credits Lipset with being the 
first to conduct an empirical study on the thesis that economic growth facilitates 
democratic political institutions and processes, he also critiques Lipset’s definition of 
democracy as ad hoc and being based “on the criterion of stability” rather “than on 
any well-defined notion of democracy.”38  In Jackman’s view, Cutright fared better 
on this account, as he was not only able to base his definition on more complex, 
specialized national institutions and use more continuous data than Lipset had, but 
also managed to score countries based on the stability of their legislatures, the nature 
of their partisan composition and on how their chief executives were selected..  
Neubauer also developed a more well-defined concept of democratic development 
measuring the proportion of adults eligible to vote, equality of representation, press 
freedom and diversity, and electoral competition.39  On the one hand, Jackman 
believed Neubauer’s analysis was superior to Cutright’s since Neubauer used prior 
theory, such as the extent of mass participation in politics and freedom of 
information, to incorporate more specific variables into his democratic index.  On the 
other hand, he thought Neubauer’s analysis was limited by problems with data 
availability from wealthier countries and does not therefore include the broader range 
of countries that Cutright included.40 
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Jackman’s analysis led him to attempt to improve on these previous empirical 
studies by suggesting his own index of democratic development.  His stated goal was 
to produce equations utilizing the index to test whether the linear model or “curvi-
linear” (threshold) model was more accurate in describing the relationship of 
economic development to democratic performance.  His index included a 
heterogeneous group of 60 non-communist countries and included the following 
criteria: the number of adults voting as a proportion to the voting population, a 
measure of the competitiveness of the party-voting system, a measure of electoral 
irregularity, and a measure of the freedom of the press.  Each of the four components 
were given similar score ranges to ensure they possessed equal weight before an 
index was created using the mean scores.  Jackman then developed three equations to 
test his index of democratic performance against his selected economic development 
variable – energy consumption per capita – using regression analysis to determine 
whether the linear or “threshold” hypotheses better explained the aforementioned 
relationship.41  His modest conclusion was that the data fit Neubauer’s “threshold 
hypothesis” much more closely than the linear approach of Lipset and Cutright; on 
the other hand, Jackman was careful to note that his data did not support one specific 
aspect of Neubauer’s theory, the idea that democratic performance declines at higher 
levels of economic development.42 
In a more recent effort to analyze the empirical linkages between democracy and 
economic development, John Helliwell provided two main critiques of Lipset’s thesis.  
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First, because Lipset used measures of economic development that followed the time 
frame used for his classification of political regimes, it became impossible to 
establish whether economic growth contributed to political democracy or if 
democracy led to economic growth.  Secondly, Helliwell challenges Lipset’s 
correlation between low pre-WWII levels of democracy and low postwar incomes, 
citing the fact that the war destroyed the economic production capabilities of the 
European countries in question.43  In response to his first critique of Lipset, 
Helliwell’s study attempts to not only measure the impact of economic growth on 
political democracy but also to measure the impact of democracy on subsequent 
economic growth.  In the former case, he uses a sampling of 125 countries from 
1976-85 for which he is able to obtain comparable data on per capita real incomes 
and regular assessments on political and civil rights;44 for the latter, he reduces the 
sampling to 98 countries from 1960-8545 and uses an empirical framework that 
examines comparative growth in a way that allows for “the convergence in the rates 
of growth of per capita GDP, possible returns to scale, and international differences in 
investment rates in human and physical capital.”46   
Helliwell’s findings lend support to the economic development thesis, suggesting 
that the positive effects of income on democracy are not a result of positive feedback 
from democracy to economic growth (reverse causation).47  Indeed, the study shows 
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that the opposite may be true, that democracy potentially has a negative effect on 
future economic growth.  At the same time, the general thesis is reinforced by two 
findings: first, that countries at higher per capita incomes are more likely to have 
democratic forms of government, and second, that countries with lower per capita 
incomes have higher initial growth rates which slow down as the country begins to 
close the gap with richer countries.48  Helliwell concludes that the data “pours cold 
water on the notion that introducing democracy is likely to accelerate subsequent 
growth,”49 but notes that delaying democracy will not likely hurt its prospects as long 
as the interim system of government continues delivering increased living standards 
to its citizens.  
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_____________________________________________________________________ 
“Income inequality is hypothesized to be an economic determinant of democratization 
(positive or negative change in level of democracy) that is as causally relevant as 
level of economic development.”50 ---Edward Muller 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
II. Counter Theories 
As time progressed, more and more studies in the Lipset tradition began to move 
away from the language of requisites, conditions and causality in favor of a dialogue 
on the impact of theories of modernization, world systems theory, and income 
equality – to name a few.  Researchers began to question in earnest the general 
proposition that it was economic growth per se that caused democratization as various 
studies actually supported the opposite conclusion that economic development might 
actually be a product of democratization in some cases.  In response to Rustow’s 
question from 1970, “what conditions make democracy grow and what conditions 
make it thrive,”51 Karl uses a comparative politics approach to illustrate the 
weaknesses (and futility) of previous research endorsing preconditions to democracy 
and to suggest a “path-dependent approach” to analyzing regime transitions to 
democracy.  According to Karl, the experience of 1980s Latin America challenged 
several schools of existing scholarship regarding democratic preconditions: Lipset’s 
thesis that a certain degree of wealth created conditions necessary to sustaining 
democracy, the theory that certain beliefs and values held by citizens are essential to 
producing the right kind of political culture, the idea that the proper sequencing of 
                                                 
50   Edward N. Muller, "Economic Determinants of Democracy," American Sociological Review 60, 
no. 6 (1995): 967. 
51   Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy," 337. 
 23
modernization determined whether economic and social transformations were 
conducive to democracy, and the notion that external influences (such as position 
within the international system) play a part in determining whether a polity is 
authoritarian or democratic.52  Given certain anomalies revealed in 1980s Latin 
America, such as Peru’s transition to democracy in the face of stagnant growth rates 
and extreme foreign debt or Argentina’s recurring reversion to authoritarianism 
despite high per capita income, Karl not only believes that no single precondition 
contributes to a general theory of democratization, but also that those circumstances 
purported to be preconditions in the past would be better perceived as outcomes of 
democracy.53 
Karl rejected the singular focus on the structural approach found in the early 
literature, advancing the idea of contingency – the notion that “outcomes depend less 
on objective conditions than subjective rules surrounding strategic choices”54 – as an 
important counter-argument.  In his view, consideration of political interaction and 
the decision-making processes were largely ignored in the search for structural 
preconditions.  This is not to suggest that he considered contingency alone to be a 
sufficient approach to answering Rustow’s question; rather, Karl proposed a “path-
dependent approach” that would clarify how structural changes could shape 
transitions in a way conducive to democratization by considering both the impact of 
structural changes upon political institutions and the resulting influence that such 
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changes would have upon individual preferences within society.  Thus, certain 
conditions may restrict or enhance the range of options available, but the role of 
collective decision-making and political interactions should not be ignored. 
One of the more recent emphases in the literature is the role of income inequality 
on development and democratization.  In his 1995 article entitled, “Economic 
Determinants of Democracy,” Edward Muller posits that income inequality is an 
economic determinant “that is as causally relevant as levels of economic 
development.”55  The basis for this claim is the global trend by middle-income 
countries towards democratic decline in the 1960s/1970s despite the fact that many of 
them were experiencing economic growth.56  Muller seeks to explain this anomaly by 
suggesting that income inequality is an inverted-U relationship to economic 
development that has a negative effect on democratization and can counter the 
positive functions of economic development.57  Although the process of economic 
development is expected to have a positive impact on democratization as it shifts the 
economic base from agricultural to industrial production, Muller explains that it also 
initially increases income inequality, a known variable for radicalizing the working 
class and creating class tensions.  As a result, he contends that income inequality is 
not compatible with the long-term stabilization of democracy.58 
Muller’s findings in Model 3 appear to be the foundation for his remaining 
conclusions.  This model shows that when income inequality is factored in, it has a 
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negative effect on democratization, making insignificant the U-curve relationship 
with economic development.  This leads to two central conclusions: first, that income 
inequality hinders democratization, and second, that when the negative impact of 
income inequality is controlled, economic development has its expected impact on 
democratization.59  For these reasons, Muller concludes that the inverted-U 
relationship of economic development and income inequality, coupled with the 
negative impact of income inequality on democratization, is likely the “principal 
structural reason why countries at intermediate levels of economic development often 
have difficulty sustaining stable democratic systems of government.”60 
In response to Muller’s thesis that income inequality is an economic determinant 
to political democracy, Bollen and Jackman provide the following critiques.  First, 
they take issue with Muller’s empirical methods and findings, suggesting that his 
effect for income inequality could be explained by other factors.  For example, 
countries with moderate levels of democracy tend to have intermediate levels of 
industrialization, as do countries with high income inequality.  This does result in 
inequality serving “as a rough proxy for intermediate levels of democracy”61 in a 
linear model, but these effects disappear when a non-linear model is used.  The 
second concern of the authors is that Muller confuses equality with equity.  They 
define equality as the “size distribution of income” and equity as “the political 
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interpretation that citizens place on their condition.”62  Therefore, when Muller 
generalizes and states that income inequality creates instability and suppresses 
democratic impulses, they believe Muller is simply assuming that injustice is 
perceived and that collective action will result, a view not borne out by the facts.  
Finally, the authors point out that Muller’s claim that higher inequality played a role 
in the decline of democracy from 1965 to 1980 “neglects the fact that many of those 
declines were followed by restorations of democracy after 1980 even though there 
were no major changes in the distribution of income.”63  The failure of Muller to 
account for the reconstitution of democracy under similar conditions to its failure 
poses a significant challenge to his thesis.  Bollen and Jackman conclude that the 
countries most at risk to democratic decline are those that have only moderate – or 
partially developed – levels of democracy and that have only developed recently, thus 
possessing less institutionalized forms of democracy.  For this reason, they call for 
future efforts that combine the study of failed democracies with ongoing 
democratization studies, in order to assess more accurately the structural factors that 
affect both the successes and failures of democracy.   
                                                 
62  Ibid.: 984. 
63  Ibid.: 983. 
 27
_____________________________________________________________________ 
“There is no income level at which democracies become more fragile than they were 
when they were poorer.”64 ---Adam Przeworski, et al. 
 
“The simple fact is that during the period under our scrutiny or ever before, no 
democracy ever fell, regardless of everything else, in a country with a per capita 
income higher than that of Argentina in 1975: $6,055.  Thirty-two democracies spent 
736 years with incomes above $6,055 and not one collapsed, while thirty-nine out of 
sixty-nine democracies did fall in countries that were poorer.”65 ---Adam Przeworski 
and Fernando Limongi 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
III. Przeworski and Threshold Theory 
Another debate that continues to have resonance in the literature is found in the 
1997 article, “Modernization; Theories and Facts.”  In this paper, Przeworski and 
Limongi equate the economic growth thesis with modernization theory and rebuff the 
idea that countries are more likely to transition to democracy as a result of economic 
development.  The authors engage the endogenous/exogenous debate, stating that 
countries are either more likely to emerge as democracies as they develop 
economically (endogenous position) or that they “may be established independent of 
economic development”66 (exogenous position).  The former they identify as a 
“modernization” theory and reject on the premise that “to assert that democracies 
emerge as a result of economic development is the same as to say that dictatorships 
die as countries ruled by them become economically developed.”67  At first 
impression, this seems to be a denunciation of Lipset’s theory, but further 
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investigation shows that Lipset’s view is considered to be exogenous, presumably 
because its emphasis is on sustaining, rather than creating democracy.  
Przeworski and Limongi’s focus on the economic growth thesis as a transitioning 
mechanism from authoritarianism to democracy may be somewhat misguided, as 
many of the key authors in support of the thesis (Lipset included) did not explicitly 
suggest that economic growth would transform dictatorships into democracies, just 
that growth improved the chances of democratization.  To be fair, the authors are 
forthright in admitting the narrowness of their question, but even so, their argument 
seems centered on a miniscule part of the literature that garners little popular support 
among most researchers.  In fact, much (if not most) of the literature supporting the 
economic growth thesis focuses on the ability of economic growth to sustain 
democracies rather than transform authoritarian regimes into democratic societies.  
This makes the authors’ thesis puzzling at first, particularly in light of their own 
results.  They find, for example, that the probability that democracy survives 
increases steadily as per capita income rises, confirming that per capita income is a 
good predictor of democratic stability; yet they also claim that modernization theory 
has no predictive value if it cannot produce a similar “threshold” at which 
authoritarian regimes are expected to transition to democratic regimes.68   
The keys to understanding the authors’ narrow focus and seemingly contradictory 
statements are twofold.  First, they are responding to a portion of the literature that 
suggests that the way to achieve democracy in the long term may be to support 
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dictatorships in the short term.  The idea that benevolent dictators may encourage 
economic growth leading to the enhanced prospects of democratization is utterly 
rejected by Przeworski and Limongi.  Second, it is precisely the fact that the authors 
establish a strong connection between levels of development (per capita income) and 
the survival of democracies that they attack the notion that growth can be relied upon 
to bring about regime change.  As committed democratic advocates, they firmly 
adhere to the idea that the best way to strengthen democracy is to “strengthen 
democracy, not support dictatorships.”69  In the end, it seems, the authors support the 
democratic sustainability arguments of the economic growth thesis, while rejecting its 
power to predict democratization involving regime change.  In other words, a 
prerequisite to their support for the thesis is that democracy has already been 
established.  Apart from this reality, they believe economic growth has little potential 
to transform authoritarianism into a process of democratization. 
In their discussion of endogenous democratization and modernization theory, 
Boix and Stokes take on the 1997 findings of Przeworski and Limongi that 
democratization was a result of exogenous rather than endogenous effects.  Boix and 
Stokes argue that Przeworski and Limongi, by limiting their sample to the postwar 
period of 1950-1990 did not account for the historical development of democracy.70   
The authors claim that in order to determine the true relationship of development to 
democratization it is necessary to push the sample back to a point in time where 
democracies did not exist and to commence investigation when differential 
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development was just beginning.71  Even though they successfully argue that 
endogenous growth played a role in the historical democratization process, they do 
not adequately explain why the results of Przeworski and Limongi’s study (1950-
1990) do not correspond to their findings from earlier periods.  Their attempt to 
account for this gap with exogenous factors such as the influence of the Soviet Union 
may partially explain a lack of regime transitions to democracy during this period, but 
it fails to discredit Przeworski/Limongi’s central thesis.  Thus, while Boix and Stokes 
have succeeded in demonstrating that endogenous development played a role early in 
the historical democratization process, they fall short in showing its explanatory 
power in the present.   
Boix and Stokes may indeed create a more comprehensive understanding of the 
historical democratization process, but it is less certain that they have established, as 
they claim, “that economic development both causes democracy and sustains it.”72  
Perhaps the most effective headway the authors make in challenging Przeworski and 
Limongi is in questioning the arbitrary manner in which the latter include/exclude 
regime transitions based on a per capita threshold.  Essentially, the claim is that 
Przeworski and Limongi only counted regime transitions for those dictatorships that 
had achieved a per capita income of $4,115, while failing to credit other countries that 
had transitioned to democracy at far lower levels.73  This is problematic on two 
different levels.  First, Przeworski and Limongi use the notion that there is a dearth of 
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regime transitions occurring at middle incomes levels and above to suggest that 
further growth is unlikely to have any democratization effects.  Secondly, by failing 
to account for transitions at lower levels of per capita income, Przeworski and 
Limongi seem to ignore the possibility that few regime transitions happen at higher 
income levels because so many occur at lower levels of development.  As Boix and 
Stokes note, “if dictatorships collapse and are replaced by democracies as they 
achieve development at these lower levels, then their absence from the pool of 
dictatorships at higher levels of income does not refute endogenous modernization 
but instead supports it.”74 
Although vigorous defendants of development as both a cause and stabilizing 
force for democracy, Boix and Stokes ultimately question the endogenous effect of 
development on democratization – suggesting that per capita income is often a proxy 
for other causes.  Like Muller, they believe a better predictor for democratization is 
income equality, claiming that their data supports “the idea that democracy is caused 
not by income per se but by other changes that accompany development, in particular, 
income equality.”75   In contrast to per capita income, which progressively loses 
strength in their models, they find that income equality is found to increase “both the 
chances of a democratic transition and the stability of democratic regimes.”76 
Boix and Stokes’ critique notwithstanding, in order to have a contextual 
understanding of Przeworski and Limongi’s article, it is important to also consider 
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Przeworski’s et al. 1996 article which asks “what makes democracies endure.”  In this 
collaborative study, the authors build statistical evidence supporting their claim that 
democracy, affluence, economic growth with a moderate rate of inflation, declining 
inequality, a favorable international climate, and parliamentary institutions are all 
conditions that affect the strength of democracy in any given country.77  Three key 
arguments are reinforced throughout the paper: modernization theory was wrong to 
suggest that dictatorships lead to democratization, economic growth is the key to 
democratic durability, and parliamentary systems enjoy longer-term democratic 
success than their presidential counterparts do. 
The study adds an interesting dimension to the idea of economic thresholds 
introduced by Neubauer decades earlier.  Not only do the authors reinforce the notion 
that socio-economic development encourages democratic political development, they 
also evaluate the probabilities of democratic success based on levels of per capita 
income.  For example, countries averaging less than $1,000 per capita income have a 
0.12 probability of dying in any given year, giving their democracy a life expectancy 
of about 8.5 years.  As per capita wealth increases, these numbers increase 
significantly; when a country reaches the $1,000-$2,000 range, democratic survival is 
projected to last sixteen years, thirty-three years in the $2,000-$4,000 range, and one 
hundred years in the $4,000-$6,000 range. This upward stabilization trend continues 
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until per capita income exceeds $6,000 at which point democracies are seen to be 
nearly impregnable.78 
One strength of the authors’ presentation is that it distinguishes the effects of 
economic performance on poor versus rich countries, focusing on the implications the 
data has for the former.  For instance, even though the data confirms that poor 
countries can strengthen democracy by achieving growth amidst low inflation and by 
narrowing the gap of income inequality, the authors are quick to point out that few 
countries with per capita income under $1,000 develop economically under any kind 
of government; moreover, when democracies do try to spring up in these countries, 
the likelihood they will die quickly is remarkably high.  On the other hand, the 
potential power of an economy on the rise to bring about democracy is evidenced by 
their finding that the survival rate for a poor democracy (under $1,000 in per capita 
income) experiencing economic growth is better than those countries in the $1,000-
$4,000 range which are undergoing economic decline.79 
The authors conclude that “poverty is a trap” which produces a cycle of more 
poverty and dictatorships.  Although the data gives some reason to hope since 
development – when it occurs – positively impacts democratization, it is 
exceptionally difficult to jumpstart the growth cycles of poor democracies.  Typically, 
countries with less than $1,000 per capita income see growth rates of 1% or less,80 
well below the 5% mark the authors see as having the maximum benefit.81  This is in 
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some measure an institutional problem that the authors believe can be partially 
addressed by adopting a parliamentary, rather than a presidential, form of 
government; however, given the likelihood that nations are “stuck” with the form of 
government they choose at first, this possibility does little to change the prospects of 
democracy either. 
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IV. The Way Forward  
This survey of the literature has revealed many of the variables social/political 
scientists consider when weighing the questions of causality in the economic 
development/democratization debate.  Even though the body of literature is very 
strong in suggesting a positive relationship between economic growth and 
democratization, it all too often focuses on the transition from authoritarian forms of 
government to democracy or tries to measure the democratizing effects of increased 
income on other types of governments.  While these approaches certainly inform 
opinion, they also threaten to clutter statistical analysis in relation to the true impact 
of economic performance on the success or failure of democratization efforts.  Future 
efforts would be better served by isolating studies that seek to explain regime 
transition from those which attempt to analyze the effects of economic growth on 
existing political systems.  The more important question, as Rustow so aptly noted, 
“is not how a democratic system comes into existence, rather, it is how a democracy, 
assumed to already be in existence, can best preserve its health or stability.”82  This is 
particularly important when analyzing the impact of growth on nascent democracies 
for two critical reasons: first, because the vast majority of nascent democracies are 
also countries with limited economic means and infrastructure, and second, because 
democracy itself is viewed as extremely fragile in the context of lower income 
countries. 
                                                 
82  Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy," 339. 
 36
A strong consensus does not yet exist on whether there is a linear relationship 
between economic growth and democratization, but if that relationship can be 
established, the implications for foreign aid are enormous.  Londregan and Poole 
approach the question of the economic growth thesis from this perspective, 
suggesting that if economic growth does in fact cause democratization, free trade and 
foreign aid should be foreign policy standards; conversely, if democratization is not a 
by-product of economic growth, attaching conditionality to foreign aid might produce 
better results.83  Given the potential implications of these policy options, it not only 
important to review the literature on the economic growth thesis itself, but to consider 
how the United States has conducted its overseas democratization programs 
historically.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
Foreign Aid and the USAID 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
“The events of 9/11 underlined the vulnerabilities of the American homeland and 
served as a wake-up call to the American public and its political leaders that 
pervasive poverty, disenfranchisement, and disaffection abroad can have 
consequences for the United States.”84  --- Carol Lancaster and Ann Van Dusen 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
I. The Changing Blueprint for Foreign Aid 
The September 11th terror attacks on the United States created a new urgency for 
development assistance.  Two foreign policy White Papers reflect the dramatic 
changes of American thinking on developmental aid as espoused by the Bush 
administration in the aftermath of the attacks.  First, the “National Security Strategy 
of the United States” proposed doubling the size of the world’s poorest economies 
within a decade.85  The President’s rationale for this goal focused on the potential 
correlation between poverty and terrorism: “Poverty does not make poor people into 
terrorists and murderers.  Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make 
weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.”86  
The 2004 USAID White Paper further delineates the developmental rationale of the 
NSS.  Because the new threat to American security is via the intersection of terrorism 
and weapons of mass destruction, the economic success of weak states is now viewed 
as a national security priority.  Since weak states provide conditions favorable to the 
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proliferation of criminal/terrorist organizations, it is therefore imperative that 
American policy seeks to strengthen weak states via developmental aid and economic 
progress.87 
Given this new concern that poverty in developing countries posed a significant 
risk to the security interests of the United States, President Bush proposed a fifty 
percent funding increase to core development programs.  The main feature of this 
“New Compact for Development” was the formation of the Millennium Challenge 
Account (MCA), a program designed to reward good governance and sound policies, 
while encouraging national ownership and fiscal accountability.  The intent of the 
MCC was “to focus aid entirely on promoting economic growth and poverty 
alleviation, targeting governments of low and middle-income countries with a 
demonstrated commitment to democracy, free markets, and investment in people.”88  
In order for these developing countries to take advantage of funding, they would have 
to exhibit determination to “govern justly, invest in their people, and encourage 
economic freedom.”89  Those nations that qualified would then be allowed to submit 
their own proposals and negotiate with the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) 
to secure grants for their poverty reduction strategies. 
From even this limited background on U.S. developmental assistance, it is clear 
that there is a new vigor for the promotion of economic growth within developing 
                                                 
87  "U.S. Foreign Aid: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century," ed. United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID, 2004). 
88   Lancaster, Van Dusen, and NetLibrary Inc., Organizing U.S. Foreign Aid: Confronting the 
Challenges of the Twenty-First Century, 16. 
89  George W. Bush, "A New Compact for Development in the Battle against World Poverty,"  (U.S. 
State Department, 2002). 
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countries. Yet not all developmental aid is the under the purview of democracy 
assistance.  Indeed, the emphasis of the MCA is to offer financial incentives for sound 
policy and good governance, the very characteristics USAID seeks to create via 
democracy programs. Thus, the introduction of the MCA does not signify a major 
change in U.S. democracy promotion per se, although it does bear observation since 
both aspire to alleviate poverty and promote economic growth through their own 
mechanisms i.e. institutions and processes versus financial incentives. 
Likewise, while the inclusion of developmental aid in the NSS is encouraging and 
indicates “a major upgrade in the acknowledged importance of developing countries 
and development progress”90 in American foreign policy, this does not imply that 
current U.S. democratization strategies give sufficient weight to economic policy or 
allow enough flexibility in distributing aid to at-risk states.  If sound policy is the 
criteria for acceptance by the MCC and “good performers first” the priority for 
transformational development,91 it becomes apparent that the goal to distance 
terrorism from susceptible poor populations is dependent on the political will of the 
target government.  Thus, while the MCA may do much to assist those who already 
have a good measure of stability, it will likely have no impact on nations where 
institutional fragmentation or government exploitation already exists. 
                                                 
90  "U.S. Foreign Aid: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century," 7. 
91  Transformational development is one of the five operational goals presented in the 2004 USAID 
White Paper.  This goal focuses on improving government, achieving economic growth, and 
investing in people. 
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_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
“The Freedom Agenda is predicated on the shared understanding that democracy 
promotion is central to our national identity and directly in the interests of the United 
States.”92 ---USAID Administrator, Andrew S. Natsios 
 
“The Freedom Agenda is based upon our deepest ideals and our vital interests.  
Americans believe that every person, of every religion, on every continent, has the 
right to determine his or her own destiny.”93 ---George W. Bush 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
II. The Emergence of the Bush Doctrine and Freedom Agenda 
The intent of the Bush administration’s “New Compact for Development” and 
NSS was to widen the developmental circle, but in some cases, where democracy is in 
its infancy and institutions are weak, they may have the opposite effect.  On the other 
hand, President Bush’s introduction of the MCC and his “New Compact for 
Development” were only early manifestations of the Bush Doctrine, representing the 
emergence of the administration’s Freedom Agenda.  While the president continued 
to emphasize the MCC’s mainstay of reward for good governance, he also began 
directing the foreign aid bureaucracy (specifically the USAID) to restructure and 
make development a national security priority.  Table 1 shows the major policies and 
papers that influenced the new development policy of the United States, culminating 
in the “Policy Framework for Bilateral Aid. 
                                                 
92   "Policy Framework for Bilateral Foreign Aid: Implementing Transformational Diplomacy through 
Development," ed. United States Agency for International Development (GPO, 2006), vi. 
93   Bush, "Bush on Freedom Agenda," http://voanews.com/uspolicy/archive/2006-09/06-09-05-
voa8.cfm. 
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Table 1: Evolution of the USAID Foreign Aid Mandate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Before considering the progression and contributions of these documents, 
however, it is useful to examine the Bush Doctrine, which serves as the ideological 
basis for the overhaul of the US foreign aid regime.  The earliest precursor of the 
doctrine was the president’s declaration to the international community in the days 
following the 9/11 attacks: “you are either with us or against us.”  At the time, this 
statement could have been interpreted as no more than defensive or reactionary 
posturing by the president.  Nevertheless, this initial declaration developed into a 
comprehensive foreign policy strategy emphasizing unilateral and/or preemptive 
military action whenever necessary, as well as the realignment of foreign aid 
priorities to focus on the new threats emanating from failed and weak states.  
Assisting these troubled states was seen as the key to winning the Global War on 
Terror since their inability to govern provides terrorists the space to thrive and plot 
against the West.  Thus, the Bush Doctrine, in addition to threatening preemptive 
action against any state harboring terrorists, aggressively sought to promote economic 
growth and democratization programs in countries with weak governance.  This mix 
of aggressive military doctrine and an expanded developmental aid agenda explains 
Month/Year Document Name 
Mar 2002 Millennium Challenge Account 
Sep 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America 
Fall 2002 Foreign Aid in the National Interest 
Jan 2004 U.S. Foreign Aid: Meeting the Challenges of the 
Twenty-First Century 
Jan 2005 Fragile States Strategy 
Dec 2005 At Freedom’s Frontiers: A Democracy and Governance 
Strategic Framework 
Jan 2006 Policy Framework for Bilateral Foreign Aid 
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why the Doctrine has often been criticized by liberals for its unilateralism and by 
realists for its tendency towards moralism.   
In his book, American Foreign Policy in a New Era, Robert Jervis discusses the 
foundational elements of the doctrine, the systemic conditions that made it possible, 
and the prospects for its long-term health as a framework for US foreign policy.  
Jervis believes the state of the international system best explains the creation of the 
Bush Doctrine.  In his view, the key reality that facilitates the policy is the idea that 
the US, Europe, and Japan form a security community in which the very possibility of 
war with each other is now inconceivable.94  As a result, the perceived benign nature 
of American power has allowed these states to make trade and economic 
interdependence their priority, while allowing US power to provide for their 
international security needs.   
Proceeding from this systemic understanding is the idea that the geopolitical 
climate was ripe for the exercise of American hegemonic power.  The terror attacks 
on US soil altered the American worldview and provided the motivation and rationale 
for the Bush administration to develop a more assertive national security doctrine.  
This doctrine was conceived from three romantic ideals held by the administration – 
the allure of American values as universal, “the expected power of positive 
examples,” and a firm “belief in the possibility of progress.”95  From these idealistic 
beginnings sprang the four doctrinal pillars of the Bush Doctrine: the determined 
promotion of democracy and liberalism abroad, the willingness to engage in 
                                                 
94  Robert Jervis, American Foreign Policy in a New Era (New York: Routledge, 2005), 93, 105. 
95  Ibid., 105. 
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preventive war to mitigate threats, the political will to act unilaterally when 
necessary, and the belief that peace and stability require the assertion of US primacy 
in world politics.96 
The 2002 NSS was the administration’s attempt to package the various 
components of the Bush Doctrine into a cohesive, unified strategy.  From start to 
finish, the strategy is evidence of a comprehensive effort by the administration to 
address the emerging geopolitical reality from a global perspective.  As Gaddis noted 
in a 2004 interview with Bernard Gwertzman, “this is an administration, I believe, 
which is thinking in global terms. It is thinking in integrated terms, in the sense that 
the various parts of the strategy interconnect with each other in a fairly impressive 
way.”97  While certain components of the doctrine, particularly the notion of pre-
emption, contributed to passionate debates among politicians and pundits alike, the 
aggressive tone of the doctrine has been tempered by an equally determined resolve 
to alleviate the economic roots of terrorism in weak states, and thus remove the need 
to act preemptively.   
 
                                                 
96  Ibid., 79-80, 84, 86, 89. 
97  John Lewis Gaddis, "Gaddis: Bush Pre-Emption Doctrine the Most Dramatic Policy Shift since 
Cold War,"  (Council on Foreign Relations, 2004). 
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_____________________________________________________________________ 
Development is now as essential to U.S. national security as are diplomacy and 
defense.”98 ---USAID Administrator, Andrew S. Natsios 
  
“Development reinforces diplomacy and defense, reducing long-term threats to our 
national security by helping to build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies.”99  ---
2006 National Security Strategy 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
III. The Evolution of Foreign Aid Policy Post 9/11 
As already mentioned, the central economic goal of the NSS was to double the 
size of the world’s poorest democracies within a decade.  To accomplish this feat, the 
strategy promised a 50 percent increase in funding to core development programs, an 
18 percent increase in US contributions to the International Development 
Association, a monitoring and evaluation system that enables donors to see 
measureable progress, an increase in the ratio of grants to loans, and an increase of at 
least 20 percent in the funding for public health programs, education and agricultural 
development.100  In response to what the administration viewed as decades of failed 
developmental policies, the strategy was clear in specifying that aid would be given to 
countries demonstrating real commitment to reform, that agencies would be 
accountable to ensure aid was actually having its intended impact on the world’s 
poor, and that decisions for aid would be based on maximum impact.  To be 
successful, the doctrine emphasized that “every project, every loan, every grant must 
                                                 
98   "U.S. Foreign Aid: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century," 3. 
99  "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," ed. The White House (GPO, 
2006), 33. 
100  "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," ed. The White House (GPO, 
2002), 21-23. 
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be judged by how much it will increase productivity growth in developing 
countries.”101 
Following the publication of the NSS in September of 2002, the USAID released 
“Foreign Aid in the National Interest,” a report that identified six foreign assistance 
priorities102 essential to the promotion of NSS-dictated foreign policy directives.  
Major features of the MCC are evident within the document, particularly the ideas of 
tying foreign assistance to development performance and rewarding good performers.  
However, in addition to rewarding good performers, the report also calls for the US to 
suspend and/or pressure other bilateral donors to suspend government assistance to 
countries where there is no commitment to democratic or economic reform, including 
assistance given through the World Bank and other multilateral organizations.103  
Thus, the document demonstrates that qualifying for U.S. foreign assistance would be 
more dependent on a country’s commitment to reform than any other variable.  
While this report reaffirmed the general propositions of the NSS, the nucleus of 
USAID’s revised foreign assistance strategy began to emerge with the publication of 
“U.S. Foreign Aid: Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century” in 2004 and the 
“Fragile States Strategy” in 2005.  Here, the agency offers a two-pronged strategy 
underscoring targeted assistance to fragile and weak states and transformational 
development for more stable countries (see Table 2 for Glossary of USAID Terms).   
                                                 
101  Ibid., 22. 
102   The six foreign assistance priorities are identified as promoting democratic governance, driving 
economic growth, improving people’s health, mitigating conflict, providing humanitarian aid, and 
accounting for private foreign aid. 
103  "Foreign Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security, and Opportunity," 10-11. 
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Table 2: Glossary of USAID Terms 
Capacity 
Building 
“Building local public and private institutions, transferring technical skills, and 
promoting appropriate policies.”104 
Crisis (States) “States where the central government does not exercise effective control over its 
own territory or is unable or unwilling to assure the provision of vital services to 
significant parts of its territory, where legitimacy of the government is weak or 
nonexistent, and where violent conflict is a reality or a great risk.”105 
Democracy and 
Governance 
(DG) 
“Technical assistance and other support to strengthen capacity of reform-
minded governments, nongovernmental actors, and/or citizens in order to 
develop and support democratic states and institutions that are responsive and 
accountable to citizens.”106 
Effectiveness “The capability of [sic] government to work with society to assure the provision 
of order and public goods and services.”107 
Failed States States “in which the central government does not exert effective control over, 
and is unable or unwilling to assure provision of vital services to, significant 
parts of its own territory.”108 
Failing States “Characterized by a growing inability or unwillingness to assure provision of 
even basic services and security to their populations.”109 
Fragile States “Countries where instability and weak governance do not provide sufficient 
foundation for long-term development.”110 
Good 
Governance 
“Encompasses commitment to the rule of law, the public good, transparency 
and accountability, and effective delivery of public services.”111 
Legitimacy “The perception by important segments of society that the government is 
exercising state power in ways that are reasonably fair and in the interests of the 
nation as a whole.”112 
Recovering 
States 
States “that are still weak, but on an upward trajectory in terms of stability and 
basic governance.”113 
Transformational 
Development 
“Transforms countries, through far-reaching, fundamental changes in 
institutions of governance, human capacity, and economic structure that enable 
a country to sustain further economic and social progress without depending on 
foreign aid.” 114 
Vulnerable 
(States) 
“States unable or unwilling to adequately assure the provision of security and 
basic services to significant portions of their populations and where the 
legitimacy of the government is in question.”115 
 
                                                 
104  "Fragile States Strategy," 23. 
105  Ibid., 1. 
106  "At Freedom's Frontiers: A Democracy and Governance Strategic Framework," 4. 
107  "Fragile States Strategy," 3. 
108  "U.S. Foreign Aid: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century," 19. 
109  Ibid. 
110  "Policy Framework for Bilateral Foreign Aid: Implementing Transformational Diplomacy through 
Development," 13. 
111  "At Freedom's Frontiers: A Democracy and Governance Strategic Framework," 3. 
112  "Fragile States Strategy," 3. 
113  "U.S. Foreign Aid: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century." 
114  Ibid., 14. 
115  "Fragile States Strategy," 1. 
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According to the 2004 White Paper, both goals have unique challenges.  In fragile 
states, “the challenge is to strengthen institutions, basic governance, and stability, in 
order to create the proper environment for conventional development assistance,”116 
while the ultimate aim of transformational development is graduation from 
dependency on developmental aid.117  Though transformational development is 
viewed as the “best investment for long-term interests,”118 the White Paper also 
contends that “developing a credible and effective strategy for fragile states is a top 
priority.”119   
According to the Fragile States Strategy (FSS), “the strategy’s overall goal is to 
guide USAID’s efforts in reversing decline in fragile states and advancing their 
recovery to a stage where transformational development progress is possible.”120  
Given this priority, the ladder of development logically begins with failed, failing, 
and recovering states, with the end goal of graduating countries as they achieve set 
objectives.  The strategic priorities mandated by the FSS for weak states are to 
enhance stability, to improve security, to encourage reform and to develop the 
capacity of institutions necessary to recovery and transformational development.121  
These objectives are guided by several principles.  First, as has been the case 
historically, decisions to engage countries and provide aid assistance will be governed 
by strategic considerations, i.e. a country/region’s importance to US foreign policy.  
                                                 
116   "U.S. Foreign Aid: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century," 13. 
117   Ibid. 
118   Ibid., 5. 
119   Ibid., 20. 
120  "Fragile States Strategy," 2. 
121  Ibid., 5. 
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Second, to maximize results, aid will target the underlying sources of fragility that are 
responsible for the government’s lack of effectiveness.  Third, although long-term 
reform is the ultimate aim, aid will focus on short-term goals that are likely to make 
an immediate and visible impact.  These latter two principles will go far to ensure that 
foreign assistance not only treats the cause instead of the symptoms of fragility, but 
also provides the best opportunity for the recipient government to build legitimacy.  
Finally, the fourth principle guiding USAID assistance programs towards fragile 
states is to establish appropriate measurement systems based on country-specific 
realities.122  
Another USAID publication that played a significant role in the formation of US 
foreign aid policy is “At Freedom’s Frontiers: A Democracy and Governance 
Strategic Framework.”  This document sought to give the rationale for USAID’s 
emphasis on democracy promotion, to explain the selection criteria and focus for 
assistance programs, and to address the specific challenges to democracy promotion 
efforts in the post-9/11 environment.  According to the Framework, democracy 
promotion in the current geopolitical environment is not only a matter of principle 
and national security, but part of a broader development agenda, where “democracy, 
good governance, and development reinforce each other to create a virtuous cycle.”123  
The guidelines for democracy promotion largely remain as they were in the 1990s, 
with a focus on strengthening the rule of law, promoting accountable governance, 
constructing democratic institutions, developing political freedom and competition, 
                                                 
122   Ibid., 5-6. 
123   "At Freedom's Frontiers: A Democracy and Governance Strategic Framework," 5. 
 49
and encouraging citizen participation and advocacy.  What has changed most about 
USAID’s promotion of democracy is the emphasis on fragility, and perhaps, the rules 
for selecting recipient countries.  In addition to long-standing criterion of strategic 
value to the United States, access to democracy assistance is offered first to countries 
where commitment to democratic reform is high and aid is likely to be effective.124 
Of all the official USAID briefs leading to the new bilateral aid framework, “At 
Freedom’s Frontiers” is perhaps the most important since it attempts to merge new 
political realities and the President’s Freedom Agenda with prior agency practices.  
For example, while the document acknowledges “the most dramatic threats to 
democracy in the twenty-first century come from transnational terrorist organizations 
and fragile states,”125 it also reaffirms the democracy promotion strategies 
prominently used at USAID beginning in the 1990s; namely, that institutions matter 
most and that DG programs ought to be at the core of foreign assistance.  In making 
this argument, the document is suggesting that the key to successful foreign 
assistance programs in a post-9/11 environment is really a continuation – albeit with a 
greater sense of urgency and the full backing of US resources – of democracy 
promotion practices of the past. 
 
 
                                                 
124   Ibid. 
125   Ibid. 
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_____________________________________________________________________ 
“We will seek to use bilateral foreign assistance to build toward a safer and more 
secure, democratic, and prosperous world to enhance our own national security.”126 -
--USAID Administrator, Andrew S. Natsios 
 
“Resources will be allocated to the activities that promise to yield the best results in 
terms of the goal under which these resources fit.”127 ---Policy Framework for 
Bilateral Aid 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
IV. The New Bilateral Policy Framework 
There are multiple objectives behind the reorganization of USAID and a revised 
policy on bilateral foreign aid.  First, given the historical challenge of various foreign 
aid objectives competing for the same aid dollar, USAID sought to separate foreign 
aid needs into manageable and measureable goals in order to meet US foreign policy 
objectives more efficiently and effectively.  Secondly, realizing that resources are 
limited, the policy emphasizes maximizing the effects of aid by denying funding 
where it is unlikely to be effective, preferring to focus available resources on 
countries and programs where commitment and performance suggest assistance will 
have its intended impact.  Finally, in order to avoid the age-old problem of self-
perpetuating aid programs, USAID sought to create graduation criteria whereby each 
type of aid includes measures of success for the recipient country.  The expectation is 
that by promoting stability and self-sustainability, it may be possible to prevent 
recipient countries from becoming dependent on aid, thereby ensuring that those 
resources will become available more quickly for other USAID priorities. 
                                                 
126  "Policy Framework for Bilateral Foreign Aid: Implementing Transformational Diplomacy through 
Development," v. 
127   Ibid., 2. 
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The newly implemented policy for bilateral foreign aid lists five core operational 
goals (see Table 3): to promote transformational development, to strengthen fragile 
states, to support strategic states, to provide humanitarian relief, and to address global 
issues and other special, self-standing concerns.128  Of these five objectives, the first 
three represent an attempt to categorize all states into distinct foreign aid priorities so 
both funding and mission management become more efficient and effective.  The 
latter two objectives deal primarily with crisis and/or disaster management and global 
concerns such as climate change, infectious diseases, and illicit drug trade.  However, 
the overwhelming emphasis behind the reorganization of foreign aid is the 
recognition that aid must seek to change the nature of development assistance by 
more clearly defining the aid categories and adhering to strict graduation criteria.  In 
doing so, the goal is twofold: to move states along the development ladder, enhancing 
their ability to collaborate with the US and others in the international community, and 
to free up foreign aid resources for other USAID priorities. 
 
                                                 
128   Ibid., 1-2. 
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Table 3: Core Operational Goals of the Policy Framework for Bilateral Foreign Aid* 
 
Core Operational 
Goals 
Goals Time 
Frame 
Criteria for 
Aid 
Country 
Commitment** 
Graduation 
Strengthen 
Fragile States 
To support 
stability, 
security, 
capacity 
development, 
and reform 
Near-
term 
Based on 
vulnerability 
to instability, 
conflict and 
crisis; 
feasibility of 
achieving 
results; foreign 
policy 
importance 
Commitment 
by host 
government 
and/or 
significant 
non-
governmental 
actors 
Transformational 
development 
would be the 
natural next step 
for graduating 
countries 
Promote 
Transformational 
Development 
To support 
lasting 
development 
progress 
Mid-
term 
Reasonably 
stable, have 
need, and are 
committed to 
development 
progress 
Adequate 
commitment 
Graduates would 
be considered on 
a case by case 
basis in regards 
to global issues 
and other special 
concerns; for 
humanitarian 
purposes; for 
foreign policy 
reasons; or to 
address fragility  
Support Strategic 
States 
To support and 
help advance 
the foreign 
policy 
objectives that 
motivate the 
assistance 
TBD Determined by 
the 
Department of 
State, the 
National 
Security 
Council, 
and/or 
Congress, with 
significant 
USAID input 
Funding is 
determined by 
foreign policy 
criteria first, 
then by need, 
commitment, 
performance, 
or other 
fragility 
criteria 
Criteria for 
graduation will 
be specific to the 
country in 
question, and 
will depend on 
the foreign 
policy concern 
that motivates 
the assistance 
Provide 
Humanitarian 
Relief 
To help save 
lives and 
alleviate 
suffering of 
people in 
distress, 
regardless of 
the character 
of their 
governments 
TBD Resources are 
allocated to 
countries 
based on 
immediate, 
urgent need 
Humanitarian 
relief is not 
dependent on 
country 
commitment, 
but takes into 
account the 
capacity of the 
recipient to 
meet its own 
needs 
Graduation will 
occur when it is 
determined that 
there is no longer 
a need for 
humanitarian 
assistance 
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Address Global 
Issues and Other 
Special, Self-
Standing 
Concerns 
To address 
other 
contributors of 
development 
as largely 
independent, 
self-standing 
issues; 
HIV/AIDS, 
other 
infectious 
diseases, 
climate 
change, illicit 
trade, etc. 
TBD Need and 
commitment in 
terms of the 
specific 
concern are the 
major criteria 
for funding, 
rather than 
general 
development 
need and 
overall 
commitment to 
good 
governance 
(See Criteria 
for Aid 
column) 
Criteria will be 
formulated for 
each concern to 
make the 
purpose of the 
assistance more 
transparent and 
ensure that aid 
effectiveness and 
graduation are 
judged by 
appropriate 
indicators 
*Information gathered from the Policy Framework for Bilateral Foreign Aid, word for word whenever 
possible. 
**Commitment is measured “by policy performance in the areas of ruling justly, promoting economic 
freedom and making sound investments in people.”129 
 
The bilateral aid policy classifies the three state-based aid categories as fragile 
states, transformational development, and strategic states.  Fragile states, defined as 
“countries where instability and weak governance do not provide sufficient 
foundation for long-term development,”130 include failed, failing and recovering 
states and represent the first level of USAID’s bilateral aid policy.  At this level, 
USAID does not actively pursue developmental goals; rather, the focus is achieving 
stability and laying the groundwork for developmental aid to be effective once it is 
introduced.  The policy emphasis for fragile states, then, constitutes a near-term 
approach that seeks to strengthen fragility “by supporting stability, security, capacity 
development, and reform with the goal of making them good performers and 
graduating them towards transformational development.”131   
                                                 
129   Ibid., 7. 
130   Ibid., 13. 
131   Ibid. 
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Transformational development, the apparent core of the new policy,132 seeks to 
transform countries “through far-reaching fundamental changes in institutions of 
governance, human capacity, and economic structure that enable a country to sustain 
further economic and social progress without depending on foreign aid.”133  Because 
this aid category assumes that countries suitable for transformational development 
“are reasonably stable, need foreign aid and are committed to the development 
progress – as evidenced by policy performance in the areas of ruling justly, promoting 
economic freedom, and making sound investments in people,”134 this category might 
be better coined “development-ready” states.  The strategy for development-ready 
states is a mid-term approach that seeks to create sustainable development within 
stable countries with good performance, with the end goal of negating the need for 
foreign aid. 
The third category of states included in the core operational objectives is strategic 
states, which are defined as countries “where U.S. foreign policy concerns and 
interests call for significantly higher aid levels than would be justified by 
development or fragile states criteria and/or where program content may be heavily 
influenced by these same foreign policy concerns.”135  Aid to strategic states is 
determined “primarily by foreign policy criteria” and then “secondarily by need, 
                                                 
132  Not only does transformational development warrant the most detailed explanation of the three 
state-based operational goals, it also is discussed first in all the major USAID documents 
discussing the strategy – a strange choice for a policy that emphasizes fragility as the major danger 
to US national security. 
133   "U.S. Foreign Aid: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century," 14. 
134   "Policy Framework for Bilateral Foreign Aid: Implementing Transformational Diplomacy through 
Development," 7. 
135   Ibid., 15. 
 55
commitment, performance, or other development or fragility criteria.”136 Unlike the 
previous two categories, funding for strategic states does not have a specific time-
based approach; countries graduate from this type of assistance only “when foreign 
policy concerns no longer warrant exceptional program levels”137 or when strategic 
priorities change. 
Under this new bilateral policy framework, the prevailing focus to attain US aid 
has shifted towards good governance, recipient commitment and country ownership.  
This new aid philosophy put the impetus on potential recipients to demonstrate the 
political will to pursue good governance.  In terms of progress towards goals of 
efficiency, effectiveness, and governmental accountability to the U.S. taxpayer, this 
new focus represents substantial improvement over past policy.  However, if the 
rationale for the new policy is to mitigate potential dangers that weak governance 
facilitates in failed states, the strategy appears to have serious flaws.  It seems 
contradictory, for example, to say that failed states and areas of weak governance 
create the greatest danger to US security on the one hand, while simultaneously 
suggesting that the US should abandon development assistance to those countries that 
do not exhibit good governance.138 
Exacerbating this contradiction is the reluctance of the US government to label 
states as fragile in the first place.  In January of 2006, the Office of Director of US 
Foreign Assistance was created to integrate the foreign aid agendas of USAID and the 
                                                 
136   Ibid., 15-16. 
137   Ibid., 16. 
138   "Foreign Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security, and Opportunity," 10. 
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Department of State (DOS).  Soon afterwards, the Director of Foreign Assistance 
(DFA) released a new set of aid categories reflecting both State Department and 
USAID priorities.  By summer, all 154 recipient states had been placed into one of 
five categories (see Table 4).  Noticeably missing from  this  list  is  USAID’s  fragile 
Table 4: US Government Aid Categories139 
Rebuilding 
Countries 
States emerging from internal or external conflict. 
Developing 
Countries 
Low or lower-middle income countries (below $3256) that 
do not meet MCA performance criteria or a hard hurdle on 
either corruption or political rights. 
Transforming 
Countries 
Low or lower-middle income countries that pass MCA 
performance criteria, as well as a hard hurdle for corruption 
and political rights. 
Sustaining 
Partnership 
Countries 
Middle income (or better) countries “for which U.S. support 
is provided to sustain partnerships, progress, and peace.” 
Restrictive 
Countries 
These are “states of concern where there are significant 
governance issues, and where direct U.S. funding is 
restricted.” 
Global or Regional 
Issues* 
“Activities that advance the five objectives, transcend a 
single country’s borders, and are addressed outside a 
country strategy.” 
*Information gathered from The U.S. Response to Precarious States: Tentative 
Progress and Remaining Obstacles to Coherence, word for word whenever possible. 
**This sixth category was added by the Director of Foreign Assistance in July 2006. 
 
states category.  According to Patrick and Brown, this omission is due to political 
considerations: “for diplomatic reasons, the administration has not specified a fragile 
state category in its taxonomy of aid recipients, choosing instead to lump most of 
them into the large grab bag of ‘developing countries’.”140  While this reorganization 
of aid categories may have facilitated the merger of USAID and DOS aid objectives, 
it also risks undermining both the FSS and the recent bilateral aid policy. 
                                                 
139  Stewart Patrick, "The U.S. Response to Precarious States: Tentative Progress and Remaining 
Obstacles to Coherence,"  (Center for Global Development, 2007), 12. 
140  Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts? Assessing "Whole of 
Government" Approaches to Fragile States (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007), 52. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
USAID and Economic Growth 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
“Since 1960, there has been a strong correlation between economic and social 
progress and democracy in the developing world.”141 ---At Freedom’s Frontiers 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
I. Conventional Wisdom Versus Agency Priorities 
This thesis began by asking if USAID policies have been informed by the 
academic debate surrounding Lipset’s economic growth thesis.  Solid evidence exists 
that policy makers and aid practitioners within the USAID are not only aware of the 
debate, but also accept the basic premises of the thesis.  In fact, two of the USAID 
documents reviewed in Chapter Three directly reference the debate.  First, the 2002 
USAID White Paper notes that “almost all countries with high levels of economic and 
social development are democracies,” 142 providing a clear reference to Lipset’s 
notion that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain 
democracy.”143  In addition, the document acknowledges the important role economic 
growth should play in development strategies, suggesting that “at least for the next 
generation, U.S. strategy for reducing poverty in developing countries must focus on 
economic growth.”144  The 2005 DG framework provides further evidence that the 
economic growth thesis has gained an audience inside the USAID, noting that 
“advances in economic prosperity and public wellbeing can enlarge the middle class 
                                                 
141   "At Freedom's Frontiers: A Democracy and Governance Strategic Framework," 6. 
142   "Foreign Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security, and Opportunity," 2. 
143   Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," 75. 
144   "Foreign Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security, and Opportunity," 11. 
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and increase the demand for sustainable democratic governance.145  Again, this idea is 
closely connected to Lipset’s early theorizing that economic growth moves society 
from an “elongated pyramid,” or predominantly lower class composition, to a 
“diamond with a growing middle class.”146  
Unfortunately, despite this awareness of the conventional wisdom that economic 
growth can promote stability and political development, USAID has not adapted well 
to the new priorities for developmental assistance.  Instead of focusing on economic 
development as the NSS advocates, democratization remains USAID’s primary 
organizational focus.  It seems that the belief that “institutions matter most” is so 
strong within USAID that economic initiatives are often an afterthought.  After all, 
since institutions must be in place when economic growth occurs in order to sustain 
development in the first place, it makes sense to prioritize democratic institutions. 
A rudimentary look at the 2002 NSS and the three primary USAID policy papers 
in this thesis lend support to this claim.  The NSS, which was the basis for USAID 
policy changes, placed a heavy emphasis on poverty alleviation and economic 
growth, as evidenced by the goal to double the world’s economies within a decade.  
In fact, the word “growth” and variations of the word “economy” appear 80 times in 
the NSS.  In contrast, the word “governance” and variations of the words “economy” 
and “institution” appear 58 times, or just 42 percent of the 138 total occurrences.147  
                                                 
145   "At Freedom's Frontiers: A Democracy and Governance Strategic Framework," 6. 
146   Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," 83. 
147   By “occurrence,” I mean a form of the word appearing in the actual text, apart from headers, 
footers, titles, and the Table of Contents. 
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In the USAID policy papers,148 on the other hand, words related to growth and 
economy appear 88 times, while democracy, governance and institutions are 
mentioned 360 times.149  This represents a huge redirection of emphasis, with the 
traditional USAID priorities of DG assistance and institution-building representing 
more than 80 percent of all occurrences.      
It would, of course, be an egregious error to suggest that USAID makes no effort 
to address economic growth in its country initiatives.  What is readily apparent by 
reviewing these programs, however, is that technical assistance, democratic 
institutions, and infrastructure receive a far greater portion of the agency’s expertise 
and resources than do programs targeting short or mid-term growth strategies.  
Indeed, even the programs listed as economic growth initiatives often focus on 
infrastructure or technical assistance.  One typical example of this is the 2007 
economic growth plan for Indonesia.150  Of the ten measures listed,151 none offer 
short-term solutions to building economic growth, although many of them – such as 
the Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation and Financial Crime Prevention Project 
                                                 
148   "At Freedom's Frontiers: A Democracy and Governance Strategic Framework."  "Fragile States 
Strategy."  "Policy Framework for Bilateral Foreign Aid: Implementing Transformational 
Diplomacy through Development." 
149   It is important to note that the “Democracy and Governance Framework” contains the vast 
majority of the occurrences of “democracy” (192 of 205) in the three USAID documents.  
However, even when this huge number is excluded, the slant towards traditional USAID language 
in the three policies is still nearly 66 percent.  
150  "Economic Growth Strengthened and Employment Created,"  (United States Agency for 
International Development), http://indonesia.usaid.gov/en/Program.4b.aspx, Accessed November 
12, 2007. 
151  The ten are the Alliance for Insurance Education (STIMRA), the Financial Crime Prevention 
Project, Indonesia Anti-Corruption and Commercial Courts Enhancement (IN-ACCE), Indonesia 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, Indonesia Trade Assistance (I-TAP), Program to Strengthen the 
Performance, Regulation and Governance of the Financial Sector in Indonesia, DCA – Danamon, 
Indonesia Competitiveness Development (SENADA), Reducing Barriers to Markets (PROMIS), 
and Volunteers for Economic Growth (VEGA). 
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– are sure to build confidence in the markets and government’s ability to produce 
investment.  Nevertheless, these measures do little to offer short-term hope for 
improved quality of life to the average Indonesian. 
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_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
“The US government has yet to forge interagency consensus on the rationale for US 
engagement; the criteria that should guide US involvement; the scale of US 
aspirations; the end state toward which these efforts should be directs; and the means 
required to achieve success.”152 ---Stewart Patrick, Kaysie Brown 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
II. Challenges to USAID Effectiveness 
 With the possible exceptions of the Marshall Plan and 1961 Foreign Assistance 
Act, the Bush administration’s reorganization of foreign aid priorities is unparalleled 
in US history.  The Bush plan – for lack of a better phrase – attempts to develop a 
global response to US security needs by combining the liberal spread of democracy 
with realist notions of security.  It entails a wholesale revision of foreign assistance 
protocols with the intent of stabilizing weak states and providing economic growth 
and opportunity to susceptible populations.  Initially, the president elected not to 
entrust this new mission to the existing foreign assistance bureaucracies, placing the 
newly founded MCC under a new management structure.  However, as the Bush 
strategy continued to expand, the USAID eventually was co-opted to develop and 
implement administration priorities.  While certain aspects of USAID’s historical 
mission have prepared the organization for this task, it is safe to say that the mission 
to double the world’s poorest economies goes far beyond its previous mandate.  
Aside from USAID's penchant for DG programs focusing on institution building, 
there are some other major barriers to achieving the economic growth goals of the 
NSS.  Heading this list is the complex nature of foreign aid funding via multiple 
                                                 
152   Patrick and Brown, Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts? , 35. 
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government institutions.  According to Patrick, the Congressional Research Services 
estimated that only 55 percent of official aid for FY05 was under USAID control.  
The remaining resources were split by the Department of Defense (19%) and other 
government agencies (26%), such as the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, Health 
and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury.153  This dispersion of aid between so 
many agencies makes it difficult to implement what Patrick and Brown’s title 
suggests, a “whole government” approach to foreign aid. 
The Pentagon views fragile and post-conflict states primarily through a national 
security prism... the State Department is preoccupied with transforming a wider range 
of weak and war-torn states into effective democracies… USAID regards state 
weakness as a developmental challenge to be addressed by working with local actors 
to create the institutional foundations of good governance and economic growth.154 
 Although a lack of coordination between agencies and divergent organizational 
priorities creates inconsistencies in foreign policy, an even greater challenge for 
USAID is their designation as a subcabinet level agency.155  Even though AID is 
charged with the enormous task of implementing the government’s “unified” 
development plan around the world, the agency is typically not represented at high-
level meetings, denying it the opportunity to be involved in important decision-
making processes.  Following his tenure as USAID Administrator, Brian Atwood 
(1993-1999), wrote about this dilemma:  
                                                 
153   Patrick, "The U.S. Response to Precarious States," 15. 
154   Patrick and Brown, Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts? , 36. 
155   This designation is also true of President Bush’s major foreign aid initiatives: the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). 
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I suspect that there were many lost opportunities to influence policy by providing the 
development perspective at the policy table.  These occurred both because AID had a 
small policy staff that was not integrated into the interagency process and because the 
larger departments did not know what they did not know about development.  In 
addition, State had no interest in inviting AID to its own table when large interagency 
issues loomed.156 
 A partial answer to this dilemma may be the creation of the Office of Director of 
US Foreign Assistance in January of 2006. The Director of Foreign Assistance, who 
reports directly to the Secretary of State, is responsible for managing foreign 
assistance funding and programs for the Department of State and USAID.  The 
mission of the DFA is twofold: “to develop a coordinated U.S. foreign assistance 
strategy; and to direct a transformation of foreign assistance to achieve the President’s 
Transformational Development Goals.”157  The DFA also serves in an advisory 
capacity to the MCC and the Office of Global AIDS, although his authority is limited 
to coordination and counsel.  Even so, as a Deputy Secretary to Secretary of State 
Rice, the new position has already provided some additional exposure for USAID and 
appears to be a step in the right direction.  
 Another of the major challenges to USAID effectiveness in its expanded foreign 
assistance role is its affinity for following the agency’s democracy promotion 
playbook.  As noted previously, USAID’s democracy assistance has traditionally 
centered on building institutions and processes rather than focusing on economic 
                                                 
156  Personal correspondence of Brian Atwood.  See Lancaster, Van Dusen, and NetLibrary Inc., 
Organizing U.S. Foreign Aid: Confronting the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century, 25. 
157  "Restructuring U.S. Foreign Aid: The Role of the Director of Foreign Assistance in 
Transformational Development,"  (Congressional Research Service, 2007), CRS-2. 
 64
policy.  In fact, from the time democracy promotion was formally made a USAID 
policy priority in 1990158 until the Bush Doctrine began to take shape following the 
9/11 terror attacks, democratic assistance did not directly target economic 
development, but centered on strengthening four institutional regimes to achieve 
democratization: the rule of law, governance, human rights and elections.159   
 Thomas Carothers identifies institutional modeling,160 “the notion that 
democratizing countries progressively shape their major socio-political 
institutions”161 to reflect the established democracies of the Western world, as a 
central process in the U.S. democratization model.  However, this focal point on 
imitating the “endpoints” of successful democracies, apart from a proper emphasis on 
the essential processes of democratization, ignores the potential for socio-economic 
influence over political stability, and risks suboptimal outcomes as a result.  As 
Bunce notes, “having the basic forms of democracy does not necessarily mean having 
the foundations… [Therefore] the quality of democracy – and perhaps its 
sustainability – is often shortchanged.”162 
This virtually exclusive emphasis on institutions as the centerpiece of U.S. 
democratization policy raises several concerns about the US foreign assistance 
                                                 
158  Thomas Carothers, "Taking Stock of Democracy Assistance," in American Democracy 
Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts, ed. Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry, and Takashi 
Inoguchi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 188. 
159  These four objectives are identified in the 2003 GAO report cited above and can be viewed on the 
USAID website as well. 
160  Institutional modeling shares a close affinity with modernization theory, which emphasizes the 
need of developing countries to adopt the institutions and processes of industrialized nations in 
order to enjoy similar rewards and advantages. 
161  Carothers, "Taking Stock of Democracy Assistance," 192. 
162   Valerie Bunce, "Democratization and Economic Reform," Annual Review of Political Science 4 
(2001): 46. 
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strategy in relation to its expanded emphasis on economic development.  First, is the 
correlation between economic growth and democratic stability lost on policy makers 
or is the evidence inconclusive that a causal relationship actually exists?  One theory 
is that policy makers tend to believe certain democratic institutions and processes 
should be in place prior to an emphasis on economic growth.  This is particularly true 
when the target country is immersed in, or emerging from, a dictatorship or 
authoritarian political system since most policy makers are averse to strengthening a 
non-democratic government.163  However, this commitment to structural reform as a 
prerequisite to economic growth needs to be evaluated carefully in light of the studies 
from Chapter Two, which suggest that causality flows naturally from economic 
development to democracy,164 that the effects of democracy on growth are negative 
(even possessing the potential to slow economic progress),165 and that initial levels of 
economic growth have a significant impact on democratic sustainability.166  If these 
studies accurately reflect the realities of lower-income, nascent democracies, U.S. 
democratization programs, for all the good they might accomplish, may not be acting 
in the best interests of long-term democratic stabilization. 
                                                 
163  It is important to note that many authors (Przeworski included) believe economic growth is just as 
likely to strengthen authoritarian governments as it is to increase democratization efforts in 
nascent democracies; thus, there can be resistance among policy makers to prioritizing economic 
development prior to the construction of democratic institutions.  
164  See Ross E. Burkhart and Michael S. Lewis-Beck, "Comparative Democracy: The Economic 
Development Thesis," American Political Science Review 88, no. 4 (1994).  Helliwell, "Empirical 
Linkages between Democracy and Economic Growth." 
165  Helliwell, "Empirical Linkages between Democracy and Economic Growth," 235. 
166  Steven E. Finkel, Anibal Perez-Linan and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Effects of U.S. Foreign 
Assistance on Democracy Building: Results of a Cross-National Quantitative Study,"  (USAID, 
2006), 7. 
 66
Secondly, since a stated goal of democratization programs is to promote 
sustainable democracy, why is a greater portion of economic aid not being expended 
to increase economic performance?  Patrick Cronin, the third-ranking official at 
USAID from 2001-2003, implicates competing objectives as the main reason why the 
central focus of economic growth and poverty reduction are not receiving sufficient 
funding.  He attributes this to the major expansion of the 1961 Foreign Assistance 
Act, now containing a staggering 2,000 pages of directives, and the 300 strategic 
objectives being pursued by USAID: “In trying to do everything nearly everywhere, 
American foreign aid ha[s] become a slave to the conceit that everything [is] equally 
important – the classic recipe for losing focus.”167 
In addition to organizational challenges, Cronin claims that the very nature of aid 
has changed significantly with the rapid advance of globalization.  In 2002, for 
example, the amount of U.S. developmental assistance was about 57 billion dollars, 
while trade with the developing world produced about 2 trillion dollars.168  
Considering this vast disparity in the potential impact of developmental aid versus 
that of trade and the claim that every dollar of aid within “sound policy 
environments” attracts two dollars of private capital,169 it is clear why President Bush, 
in promoting his “New Compact for Development,” emphasized that in order “to be 
                                                 
167  Patrick M. Cronin, "U.S. International Development Assistance: What Are the Options for the 
Future?,"  (Aspen Institute, 2004), 16. 
168  Ibid., 17. 
169  "Millennium Challenge Account Update,"  (United States Agency For International Development, 
2002), http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/2002/fs_mca.html. 
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serious about fighting poverty, we must be serious about expanding trade”170 – and 
thus, the economic growth potential of developing nations. 
Finally, why has U.S. foreign policy seemingly ignored the correlation between 
economic growth and successful democratization, particularly among emerging 
democracies?  The historical origins of democracy assistance point to a probable 
contributor.  Since the success of the Marshall Plan in Europe, the United States 
government has continued promoting democratization assistance as a foreign policy 
necessity.  Soon after Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act in 1961, President 
Kennedy founded the USAID to serve as the primary foreign assistance agency of the 
US government.  In his rationale for proposing this new foreign assistance program, 
Kennedy pointed to the potentially dire consequences of economic collapse in 
developing countries, claiming it “would be disastrous to our national security, 
harmful to our comparative prosperity, and offensive to our conscience.”171  This 
tension between the exercise of moralistic American values and national security has 
played a role in U.S. foreign policy ever since, but except in rare cases where the 
American public is highly energized for a foreign policy cause, realism and utility 
calculation have generally triumphed over principle and compassion.  Thus, national 
security has proven to be a much stronger motivator for development assistance than 
disaster, famine, or economic hardship ever will be. 
 
                                                 
170  Bush, "A New Compact for Development in the Battle against World Poverty." 
171  Quote attributed to John F. Kennedy: http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/usaidhist.html.  Accessed 
7 July 2006.  
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_____________________________________________________________________ 
“Research indicates that the countries most prone to conflict, crisis, and state failure 
are those that are poor or not making development progress.”172 ---US Foreign Aid: 
Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century 
 
“Without economic prosperity and the ability to meet basic needs, democratic 
advances may be jeopardized.”173 ---At Freedom’s Frontiers 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
III. Beyond the Status Quo of Democracy Promotion 
 
Last year, American democratization programs received a boost from the 
academic community when a Vanderbilt-led study sanctioned by the USAID 
concluded that US DG assistance174 is the only variable that has a significant positive 
impact on democratization.175  This conclusion seemed to vindicate the long-standing 
emphases of the two pillars of American democracy assistance: building democratic 
institutions and providing technical assistance.  At the same time, the authors 
cautioned against concluding that other variables are irrelevant, claiming primarily 
that certain variables may have application through other considerations such as 
economic factors, GDP growth or regional democratic diffusion.176 
Although it is apparent in the literature that US DG programs have achieved a 
measure of success, the recent elevation of developmental aid as a national security 
priority would seem to require faster, more optimal results.  Since the Vanderbilt 
                                                 
172   "U.S. Foreign Aid: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century," 7. 
173  "At Freedom's Frontiers: A Democracy and Governance Strategic Framework," 5. 
174  According to the USAID, the goals of Democracy and Governance programs are four-fold: 
strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights, promoting elections and political 
processes, increased development of civil society, and more transparent and accountable 
governance.  Missing from the democracy assistance blueprint is any substantive reference to the 
role of economic development. 
175  Finkel, "Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building," 1, 3, 83. 
176  Ibid., 85. 
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study agrees that “initial levels of economic development… ha[ve] a great deal to do 
with democratic sustainability,”177 does it follow that targeted growth in per capita 
income may be more beneficial to poorer nascent democracies than a predominant 
focus on institutions and processes?  Three premises of threshold theory suggest this 
is worthy of consideration: poor democracies have a much higher risk of failure, 
failure becomes less likely as per capita income increases, and economic growth 
enjoys maximum democratization impact when targeting poor democracies.  It is well 
established, of course, that DG programs slowly increase democratization over time, 
but still unanswered is whether an earlier focus on economic growth might hasten the 
process. 
To be clear, I do not seek to assert that economic growth should be encouraged to 
the detriment of democratic structures, nor am I suggesting that current DG programs 
do not have important roles to play in American foreign policy.  On the contrary, a 
great deal of diversity in approach is needed in order to address the different 
geopolitical contexts that exist in the international system.  Yet it is important to note 
that USAID’s own analysis “suggests that fragile states are largely a subset of poor 
countries with only fair or weak policy performance,”178 making them less apt to 
qualify for certain incentive-based aid – which is often based on prerequisites of 
sound policy and good governance – and more reliant upon traditional DG programs 
to facilitate democratization.  While certain ideas associated with “threshold” theory 
are still highly controversial (e.g. economic growth causes democratization), there is a 
                                                 
177  Ibid., 7. 
178  "U.S. Foreign Aid: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century," 19. 
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growing body of literature that makes a case for reexamining how economic aid and 
democratic assistance should be sequenced. 
As the review of the literature makes clear, economic growth is not only 
conducive to democratic stability, it is also crucially important to the survival of the 
world’s poorest democracies.179  In the current geopolitical context, the survival of 
budding democracies is clearly more important than ever; however, since weak and 
failed states are seen as greater sources of global instability, it would appear to be in 
the best interests of the United States to find alternative means of promoting growth 
when traditional USAID DG programs do not suffice.  Considering the Bush 
administration’s foreign aid mandate and the potential for economic thresholds to 
achieve that mandate, it seems a better foreign aid strategy needs to be employed – 
one that recognizes steady economic growth is paramount to both nascent 
democracies and at-risk states.  
                                                 
179  Przeworski et al., "What Makes Democracies Endure?," 42. 
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EPILOGUE 
This thesis, while providing some analysis of previous quantitative studies, has 
largely been a qualitative exercise.  In the course of research, however, I developed a 
strong interest in the notion that democratization is likely to increase as per capita 
income rises.  Because of this interest, I originally planned to do my own analysis of 
the data, but the task of pursuing a quantitative analysis exceeded both time restraints 
and my current statistical ability.  Nevertheless, I began to set forth a basic framework 
for that study, should I have the opportunity to pursue this interest in the future. 
This proposed study would seek to follow a select group of low-income nascent 
democracies over time, tracking annual changes in per capita income and comparing 
those changes with the level of democratic freedom in those countries.  In order to 
avoid recreating the exact parameters of previous studies, it would be essential to 
include in this study only countries that clearly demonstrated a commitment to 
democratic government at the outset.180  For this reason, my investigation would not 
attempt to consider the concept of regime change, but would assess only countries 
that have started down the path of democracy.  To meet this requirement, I would 
borrow from Karl’s definition, which focuses on fair and free elections (“a set of 
institutions that permits the entire adult population to act as citizens by choosing their 
leading decision makers in competitive, fair, and regularly scheduled elections…”),181 
and use it in conjunction with Dahl’s definition, which clarifies that democratic 
                                                 
180  This is true whether revolution, war, regime change, or the political elite brought about the 
beginnings of democracy. 
181  Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," 2. 
 72
elections are ones in which the opposition has a chance of winning.182  With this in 
mind, a country would not be considered in this study unless free and open elections 
have been instituted, with the results sanctioned by the government and/or the 
international community (if necessary). 
In regards to methodology, the initial focal point of my investigation would be on 
Central America and South America for the following reasons.  First, since Latin 
America has historically been the central focus of U.S. democratization programs, 
this is a natural starting point for investigation.  Second, and more importantly, most 
Latin American countries have attempted democratization and failed (or regressed) at 
least once, which provides the opportunity to not only evaluate the impact of 
economic growth, but also to consider the effects of economic stagnation upon the 
democratization process.  Lastly, when the majority of Latin American countries 
started on the path to democracy, they were “at-risk,” underdeveloped countries rife 
with low per capita incomes, further facilitating focus on democracy in its infancy 
stage. 
The main components of the study would be annual reports on per capita income, 
as reported by the World Bank,183 and the Gastil Indices from 1973-2003.  The Gastil 
Index184 measures the level of democracy within individual countries and scores them 
                                                 
182  Robert Alan Dahl, Polyarchy; Participation and Opposition (New Haven,: Yale University Press, 
1971). 
183  The CIA Factbook will be used to supplement any statistical information unavailable through the 
World Bank. 
184  The Index, created by Raymond D. Gastil, was used to create annual reports on the status of 
democracy in countries worldwide.  From 1989 onwards, Freedom House has operated the Gastil 
Index.  A copy of the World Comparative Rankings for 1973-2005 may be found at the following 
Freedom House link: http://65.110.85.181/uploads/FIWrank7305.xls.  Accessed 5-22-06. 
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from a minimum of 7 (not free) to 1 (free).185  One goal of the research, then, would 
be to chart per capita income in Latin American countries in conjunction with the 
Gastil Index, in order to measure whether failed or retreating democracies were 
preceded by a downturn in economic growth on the one hand, and if steady economic 
growth accomplished a strengthening of democracy on the other.  Keeping in mind 
that Przeworski and Limongi claim the results of economic downturn occur within a 
year’s time of poor performance, regardless of previous growth,186 special attention 
would be given to the Gastil Index in years following economic decline, and to per 
capita income in years preceding an increase on the democratization index. 
If the claims are correct that economic growth promotes democracy then there 
should be a high percentage of countries that remain at the same level or improve on 
the Gastil Index in years following economic growth (particularly growth above 5%).  
Conversely, in years following economic downturn or stagnation, there should be a 
notable deterioration on the Gastil Index, particularly for countries where per capita 
income is considered severely at risk ($1,000 or below).  Effects may be more 
moderate in the middle-income levels regardless of growth or downturn, but we 
should expect to see a stronger correlation when either growth or recession becomes 
the status quo for multiple consecutive years. 
The results of this study should reinforce a couple of key assertions of “threshold” 
theory. First, it should further confirm that economic growth stimulates additional 
democratization when it occurs in countries already on the path to democracy.  
                                                 
185  The middle range is listed as “partly free.”  
186  Przeworski and Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," 169. 
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Second, and more significantly, it should highlight the precipitous nature of low-
income countries in terms of their potential to sustain democracy apart from steady 
economic growth.  Considering again the conventional wisdom that democracies do 
not go to war with other democracies, perhaps this study could eventually contribute 
to economic performance being given greater weight in future U.S. foreign assistance 
programs. 
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